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Abstract: This article draws attention to the relation between Husserl’s ‘talk of Being’ in the 
transcendental reduction in Ideas I (1913) and Heidegger’s re-orientation of Husserl’s idea of 
transcendental phenomenology towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to 
Dasein in Being and Time (1927). It argues that Heidegger’s selection of ‘death’ as an ‘object’ for 
phenomenological elucidation challenges both the confines and the suppositions of Husserl’s ‘talk of 
Being’ in the reduction as the sole possibility for transcendental phenomenology. It also argues that 
Heidegger’s distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ talk about death in Being and Time 
radically challenges Husserl’s distinction between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’ espoused in 
the Logical Investigations (1900–01). This is why Husserl is correct to see, much to his disappointment 
and incomprehension, both overt and covert criticisms of his philosophical position in Being and Time 
by its author. Yet despite Husserl’s misgivings about Heidegger’s phenomenological credentials, Being 
and Time is a work in phenomenology because it is founded in the experience of finitude and it 
provides a conception of philosophy that is capable of subsuming Husserl’s reduction under its own 
grander conception of transcendental phenomenology as ‘fundamental ontology’. 
 
 
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time was edited and published by Edmund Husserl as 
volume VIII of his Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in the Spring 
of 1927.1 It was also published, in the same year, as a separate printing by the Max 
Niemeyer’s publishing house for phenomenology.2 Yet despite this close association 
with Husserl’s phenomenology agreement about the actual extent and the precise 
nature of the influence that Husserl’s phenomenology exercised on Heidegger’s 
thinking in Being and Time has not been reached. In his major study of The 
Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Herbert Spiegelberg, who was 
probably the first commentator to raise the question, ‘(H)ow far is Heidegger’s 
thinking rightfully to be included in the history of the Phenomenological 
Movement?’, remarks that ‘(T)his question [about Heidegger’s thinking], which is of 
considerable importance for the present enterprise, was usually not even raised; nor 
 
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962, 2000); Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957), also published in Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, ed. by Edmund Husserl, Vol. 8 (1927), 1–438. Further 
references will be to Being and Time, with pagination of the original German text following the 
English page reference, separated by a colon, e.g., Being and Time, p. 45:23. 
2 There is a debate as to whether the separate edition (‘Sonderdruck’) was published before or after the 
appearance of Being and Time in Husserl’s Yearbook. See, Thomas Sheehan, ‘General Introduction. 
Husserl and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a Relationship’, in Edmund Husserl, 
Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–193I): The 
‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’ Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’ and Husserl’s 
Marginal Notes in ‘Being and Time’ and ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’, trans. and ed. by Thomas 
Sheehan & Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997), pp. 1–32 (p. 21, n. 74). 
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is it easy to answer it’.3  Since Spiegelberg made this observation in 1960, there have 
been several attempts in recent decades to determine the philosophical relation 
between Husserl and Heidegger.4 This issue, however, is still a matter of much 
controversy and confusion.5 One commentator, for instance, after underscoring the 
point that ‘Husserl’s phenomenology was of paramount importance for the 
conception and composition of Being and Time,’ is forced to continue and admit, like 
so many other commentators, ‘yet it is difficult to say exactly what the nature and 
scope of his [Husserl’s] influence on Heidegger amounted to in the end.’6 Unless 
both the nature and the scope of Husserl’s influence on Heidegger’s philosophy is 
determined, however, it will be difficult to substantiate the claim that Husserl’s 
phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition 
of the philosophy of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ attempted by Heidegger 
in Being and Time.7  Husserl himself, after all, in a letter he wrote to Alexander 
Pfänder on 6 January 1931, informs him that after devoting two months (during the 
Summer of 1929)8 to a close reading and serious study of Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(and of some of his more recent writings) he had arrived at  
 
the distressing conclusion [... that] philosophically I have nothing to do with this 
Heideggerean profundity, [...] that Heidegger’s criticism [of my work], both open and 
veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding [of my work]; that he may be involved in 
the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered my 
life’s work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realised this for a long 
time.9  
 
3 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 3rd revised and enlarged 
edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhman (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 
339; first edition, 1960; second edition, 1976.  
4 Spiegelberg also notes this in the later re-issue of The Phenomenological Movement, see, ibid., p. 413, n. 
4. 
5 Cf., the ‘review essay’ by Burt Hopkins on, ‘The Husserl-Heidegger Confrontation and the 
Essential Possibility of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology 
and the Confrontation with Heidegger’, Husserl Studies 17 (2001), 125–148. 
6 Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic. Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in ‘Being and Time’ 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 53. 
7 Husserl certainly helped Heidegger, on the basis of the publication of Being and Time (despite its 
unfinished nature), to secure the Chair of philosophy at Freiburg University in 1928. The story 
behind the various drafts and the hurried publication of Being and Time is now well documented. See, 
Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993). 
8 For editorial purposes, Husserl had given Being and Time a quick read in 1926. The ‘two months’ 
that Husserl read Heidegger’s Being and Time more closely are either July-August or August-
September of 1929. See, Sheehan, ‘Husserl and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a 
Relationship’, p. 29, n. 106.  
9 Edmund Husserl, ‘Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931’, in Husserl, Psychology and 
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–193I), p. 482. Husserl was aware 
of the ‘colossal’ influence that Heidegger was exerting on his students at Marburg University (1924–
1928), but he still thought, as Cairns recounts in his meetings with Husserl at Freiburg University in 
the mid 1920s, that Heidegger ‘was with me [Husserl]’, it was just that ‘I [Husserl] simply could not 
understand his [Heidegger’s] language’. Dorion Cairns, ‘My Own Life’, in Phenomenology: Continuation 
and Criticism, Essays in Memory of Dorion Cairns ed. by Fred Kersten & Richard Zaner (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 1–13 (p. 7). In the early to mid-1920s Husserl was often heard to 
remark to Heidegger: ‘You and I are phenomenology’. Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and 
Fink (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 9. It was not until the Summer of 1929 that Husserl fully 
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 Whether Heidegger did misunderstand Husserl’s philosophical project in 
phenomenology, or not, is not the main concern of this article. The aim of this 
article, rather, is to shed some much needed light on the influence, if any, that 
Husserl’s thinking had on Heidegger’s thinking in Being and Time.10 Why it is 
particularly difficult to achieve an understanding and evaluation of the philosophical 
influence that Husserl’s thinking had on Heidegger’s thinking needs to be briefly 
outlined and addressed first. 
 
I 
DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
HEIDEGGER’S THINKING IN BEING AND TIME AND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
There are three main reasons why it is hard to ascertain any positive influence 
Husserl’s phenomenology had on Heidegger’s thinking in Being and Time. Firstly, in 
Being and Time Heidegger appears to disagree with the actual content that Husserl 
had demarcated for phenomenology. As Husserl defines it, phenomenology is 
primarily the study of consciousness, or, more accurately stated, of the way in which 
human consciousness is always a consciousness of something, or directed towards 
something. This is what Husserl means, when he writes in the First Book, General 
Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology of his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy, published in 1913, that ‘the name of the problem (der 
Titelproblem) that encompasses all of phenomenology is [the] intentionality [of 
consciousness]’.11 For Heidegger, however, the main topic in phenomenology is not 
 
realized just how different, if not antagonistic (as it appeared to him) Heidegger’s conception of 
phenomenology was to his idea of phenomenology. 
10 See Heidegger’s own account of this issue in his autobiographical sketch ‘Mein Weg in die 
Phänomenologie’, in Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 81–
90. Joan Stambaugh translates the title of this essay as ‘My Way to Phenomenology’ in, On Time and 
Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 74–82. In 
this account, however, Heidegger clearly wishes to convey to his readers that his way into 
phenomenology (in die Phänomenologie), in spite of all the contingencies that first lead him to Husserl’s 
texts of the Logical Investigations (1900–01) in 1909 and to meeting Husserl personally in his 
workshops at Freiburg University (1919–1923), was a way that eventually lead him through (durch) 
phenomenology to ‘the Question of Being’ (die Seinsfrage). Thus we will refer to and translate the title 
of this essay as ‘My Way into Phenomenology’. All of the late essays written by Heidegger in the 
early 1960s and contained in  Zur Sache des Denkens, ‘Zeit und Sein’ (1962), ‘Mein Weg in die 
Phänomenologie’ (1963), and ‘Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens’ (1964), 
address this same issue, in one way or another.  
11 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, 
General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1982); Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, 
Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913); Hua Vol. III/ 1 & III/ 2 ed. 
by Karl Schumann (1977, 1995). Henceforth abbreviated as Ideas I, with English pagination given 
first followed by German, separated by a colon. Ideas I, p. 349: 303; trans. mod. Prior Ideas I, Husserl 
had inaugurated his idea of phenomenology as a descriptive-eidetic psychological examination of the 
experiences of a valid normative logical consciousness as such in his major two-volumed study of 
Logische Untersuchungen:  Volume One, subtitled Prolegomena zur reinen Logik appeared in 1900; Volume 
Two, subtitled Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Volume Two was published 
in two parts in 1901, the first part containing five investigations and the second part containing the 
long and separate Sixth Logical Investigation. They were re-issued by Husserl several times during 
his career in 1913, 1921, 1922 and 1928. Further reference and quotes will be taken from, Edmund 
Husserl, Logical Investigations, two vols., trans. by John N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1970); Logische Untersuchungen. I. Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Halle, 1900), II. Teil: Untersuchungen 
 
88 
 
consciousness and its objectivities, but ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and 
its relation to Dasein, by which Heidegger means the awareness of the ‘There’ (Da) 
of ‘Being’ (Sein), and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiende) 
in Being.12 
The second difficulty in ascertaining any direct connection between 
Husserl’s and Heidegger’s thinking is that Heidegger appears not only to ignore the 
content of Husserl’s phenomenology but also to reject, in particular, the method of 
enquiry in phenomenology that Husserl had prescribed. For Husserl, 
phenomenology, as he understands it, attempts to elicit intuitively verifiable, 
essential and invariant features of our intentional experiences of consciousness, 
whatever the latter may be. The method he operates is strictly eidetic intuition.13 By 
comparison, for Heidegger phenomenology is not a matter of ‘seeing’ essential 
features of our experiences, but of ‘hearing’ meaning that is deposited and left 
‘unthought’ in reflections on ‘Being’ in the history of metaphysics and in our daily 
life. Thus Heidegger’s method of philosophizing necessarily involves a hermeneutic 
dimension to his act of retrieving the question of the meaning of Being in 
philosophy and for phenomenological research that is completely absent from 
Husserl’s eidetic method of enquiry.14 
 
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, In zwei Bänden (Halle, 1901); Gesammelte Werke, 
Husserliana (Dordrecht: Kluwer), Vol. XVIII, ed. by Elmar Holenstein (1975) and Vol. XIX, ed. by 
Ursula Panzer (1984). 
12See, Being and Time, Introduction II, § 7C. The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology. In 
normal German, ‘Dasein’ denotes the existence of anything; hence one can write a book entitled Vom 
Dasein des Gottes (On the Existence of God). Heidegger, however, gives this term a unique meaning in 
German and it only retains that meaning in the context of his elaboration of what he calls in Being 
and Time ‘fundamental ontology’, an approach to the meaning of Being that necessarily includes one’s 
self, or, more precisely speaking from Heidegger’s point of view, of an awarness of the ‘There’ of 
‘Being;’, and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is, as part of that question. For 
Heidegger, then, ‘(i)n the question of [the meaning of] Being there is no “circular reasoning” 
[between Dasein and Sein] […] [because] Here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the 
inquiry itself, and this belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of Being (gehört zum eigensten 
Sinn der Seinsfrage)’ (ibid. p. 28:8). 
13 See, Ideas I, §75. ‘Phenomenology As a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of Pure Experiences’. 
14 In a Letter to Roman Ingarden on 2 December, 1929, Husserl quite pointedly remarks about both 
the content and the method of analysis employed by Heidegger in Being and Time that, ‘I can not 
admit his work within the framework of my phenomenology and unfortunately that I also must 
reject it entirely as regards its method, and in the essentials as regards its content’. Quoted by 
Sheehan, ‘Husserl and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a Relationship’, p. 29, and see 
corresponding n. 110. It was, nonetheless, Heidegger’s very style of philosophising and the way in 
which he practiced his particular version of ‘phenomenological seeing’ that became part of the allure 
of his teaching for his students from his earliest days of lecturing at Freiburg (1919–1923) to his later 
post at Marburg (1924–1928). See, Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. by 
Ewald Osers (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), Ch. 6 ‘Revolution in Germany and 
The Question of Being’ (pp. 89–106), especially Safranski’s account of Heidegger’s use of the 
example of perceiving a lectern, where the ‘experiencing’ of the lectern in terms of ‘it worlds’ (es 
weltet) ‘in Lecture Hall 2 of the University of Freiburg on a grey February day in 1919’ (pp. 94–96) 
becomes a kind of an enactment of a perception whereupon, ‘(L)ooking at the lectern, we can 
participate in the mystery that we are and that there exists a whole world that gives itself to us’ (p. 
105). Later in the same lecture-course (War Emergency Semester 1919) Heidegger suggests that 
Husserl’s defence of ‘intuition’ as the ‘principle of all principles’ (in §24 of Ideas I) is better grasped as 
‘the understanding intuition, the hermeneutical intuition’. Heidegger, ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the 
Problem of Worldview’,  Part Two Phenomenology as Pre-Theoretical Primordial Science, Ch. 3 
Primordial Science as Pre-Theoretical Science, §20 Phenomenological Disclosure of the Sphere of 
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Thirdly, and perhaps most contentious of all, Heidegger claims that what he 
attempted to do in Being and Time (notwithstanding its incompleteness) was not only 
in accord with the principle of phenomenology that Husserl had advocated, but 
more directly in accord with that principle when compared, in Heidegger’s estimation, 
to Husserl’s choice after his Logical Investigations (1900–01) to develop 
phenomenology in the direction of the transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913) and 
then after, ‘according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte’.15 This is an 
exceedingly complex and intricate self-evaluation by Heidegger of his philosophical 
relationship to Husserl’s thought because it indicates that his own starting point in 
philosophy is so inextricably bound up with Husserl’s philosophy that it cannot be 
broached without addressing its point of critical contact with the development of 
Husserl’s philosophy. Nowhere, alas, does Heidegger provide us with any clear 
indication regarding where precisely this point of contact between his thinking and 
Husserl’s lies, except, perhaps, in his well-known and often repeated allusion to the 
influence of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, and in particular to the distinction that 
Husserl draws between categorial and sensuous intuition in the Sixth Logical 
Investigation.16 Heidegger, in other words, would like to give us the impression that 
 
Lived Experience, c) Hermeneutic Intuition, in Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 
trans. by Ted Sadler (London & New York: Continuum, 2000; 2008), pp. 89–90 (p. 89). Husserl, of 
course, meant no such thing in his appeal to intuition in the principle of all principles in §24 of Ideas 
I (1913), he meant ‘eidetic’ intuition as the method of analysis to be employed in the form of 
‘phenomenological seeing’ for phenomenology. In his way of doing phenomenology, then, the young 
Heidegger is already in 1919 heavily under the sway of influence from his reading of Dilthey’s 
hermeneutic method of enquiry. 
15 This is a claim Heidegger makes in his letter to Fr William Richardson in 1962. In full, Heidegger 
writes: ‘Meanwhile “phenomenology” in Husserl’s sense was elaborated into a distinctive 
philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The historicity of 
thought remained completely foreign to such a position [...]. The question of Being, unfolded in Being 
and Time, parted company with this philosophical position, and that on the basis of what to this day I 
still consider a more directed adherence (sachgerecthteren Festhaltens) to the principle of phenomenology’. 
Heidegger, ‘Preface’/ ‘Vorwort’, in William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. viii–xxiii (p.xiv–xv); trans. mod., my emphasis. 
16 ‘As I [Heidegger] myself practised phenomenological seeing (phänomenologische Sehen), teaching and 
learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed 
understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, my interpretation leaned anew towards the Logical 
Investigations, above all the sixth investigation of the first edition. The distinction which is worked out 
there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope (in seiner Tragweite) 
for the determination of [the question of] the ‘manifold meaning of being (der ‘mannigfachen Bedeutung 
des Seienden)’. Heidegger, ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, p. 78:86. The question regarding the unified 
sense of being (Sinn des Seins) determining the four meanings of being (Beudeutung des Seienden) that 
Aristotle identifies is one that Heidegger says he raised about Franz Brentano’s 1862 doctoral 
dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, which he received from Konrad 
Gröber, the pastor of Trinity Church in Constance, in the Summer of 1907 (ibid., p. 74:71). Because 
neither Aristotle nor Brentano addressed this issue, Heidegger tells us that this led him, almost 
immediately in his First semester at the Catholic Seminary at Freiburg University in 1909, to seek out 
Husserl’s Logical Investigation because ‘I [Heidegger] had learned from many references in 
philosophical periodicals that Husserl’s way of thinking (Husserls Denkweise) was determined by Franz 
Brentano’ and ‘(F)rom Husserl’s Logical Investigations I [Heidegger] expected [to receive] a decisive aid 
in the questions stimulated by Brentano’s dissertation’ (ibid., pp. 74–75:81–82, trans. mod.). 
Heidegger returns to this distinction between categorial and sensuous intuition in his last seminar at 
Zähringen in 1973. It has been investigated thoroughly by Jacques Taminiaux in, ‘Heidegger and 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations. In Remembrance of Heidegger’s Last Seminar (Zähringen, 1973)’, 
trans. by J. Stephens, Research in Phenomenology, 75 (1977), 58–83. To be fair to Heidegger, he never 
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he develops an issue that the early Husserl had left ‘unthought’ (ungedacht) in the 
Sixth Logical Investigation regarding the question of the meaning of Being (and its 
relation to Dasein), even if it is clear that the Logical Investigations themselves are not 
concerned about ‘die Seinsfrage’ and its relation to ‘Dasein’ (as Heidegger understands 
these terms).  
We know, nonetheless, what the Logical Investigations are concerned with and 
what they are not concerned with.17 They are concerned with the rejection of logical 
psychologism in volume one (hence Husserl’s depiction of this volume as a 
Prolegomena) and with the provision that follows, in the subsequent six investigations 
that comprise volume two, of detailed descriptive-eidetic-psychological analyses that 
clarify the meaning of the experiences of a normatively-valid logical consciousness 
as such.18 The distinction that Husserl makes in the Sixth Logical Investigation 
 
maintains that Husserl actually saw ‘the question of Being’ as an issue in the phenomenology of the 
Logical Investigations (or in any other work by Husserl), but Heidegger does say in the Zähringen 
Seminar that Husserl ‘brushes’ (p. 58) the ‘question of Being’ in his thinking about the distinction 
between categorical and sensuous intuition in the Sixth Logical Investigation, making this indication 
and connection ever more enigmatic.  
17 In his 1925 Summer Semester Lecture course at Freiburg University Husserl explicitly draws his 
students’ attention to the fact that the task of his Logical Investigations (1900–1901), which were ‘the 
results of my ten years effort’, lay in providing ‘eine Klärung der reinen Idee der Logik im Rückgang 
auf die im logischen Bewußtsein, im Erlebniszusammenhang logischen Denkens sich vollziehende 
Sinngebung oder Erkenntnisleistung’. Hua IX, § 3. ‘Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Logischen 
Untersuchungen’, p. 20; Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, p. 22. Regarding the 
significance of the Logical Investigations for his own development of phenomenology, Husserl calls 
them ‘a first break-through (ein erster Durchbruch)’ in the ‘Introduction’ to his 1913 publication of Ideas 
I (p. xviii: 2). In the Foreword to Second German Edition, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, in 1913 
Husserl also notes: ‘My Logical Investigations were my “break-through”, not an end (nicht ein Ende), but 
rather a beginning (ein Anfang).’ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 43: Hua XVIII, p. 8. See, also, E. 
Husserl, Introduction to the Logical Investigations. Draft of a Preface to the Logical Investigations, trans. by Philip 
J. Bossert and C. H. Peters (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 32. The recent editor of the re-
issued Logical Investigstions thinks that Husserl was unclear about the ‘breakthrough’ of the Logical 
Investigations. Cf., Dermot Moran, ‘Introduction’, in E. Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations 
(London: Routledge, 2001), pp. xxv–lxxviii (p. xxxi). He also writes, ‘(T)he Logical Investigations 
constituted Husserl’s “breakthrough” into phenomenology, though at the time he was somewhat 
unclear about the exact nature of this supposed new way of doing philosophy.’ D. Moran, Introduction 
to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 124. Heidegger expresses similar 
sentiments in ‘My Way into Phenomenology’ about Husserl’s lack of clarity surrounding the 
‘breakthrough’ of the Logical Investigations. For Husserl, however, the new way of actually doing 
philosophy (descriptive psychology) in the Logical Investigations — which, it is true to say, only became 
fully clear to Husserl, on reflection, after he had done it — is doing philosophy as descriptive-eidetic 
psychology. This clearly and unequivocally marks Husserl’s break-with Brentano’s new science of 
descriptive psychology and his break-through in descriptive psychology to a descriptive-eidetic science 
of psychology. This also explains Husserl’s insistence on the point that ‘descriptive psychology’, in 
the way in which it was understood by Brentano and his followers, does not properly characterise 
what exactly is happening in the Logical Investigations. Not all commentators agree with themselves, or 
with Husserl concerning exactly what this breakthrough is. The break-through of the Logical 
Investigations, nevertheless, is not the break-through to transcendental idealism, this occurs later for 
Husserl, around 1907–1908 (see, infra, n. 24); it is, rather, the break-through to the acknowledgement 
of the givenness of intended ideal objects (or essences) to intuition. Cf., however, Moran, Introduction 
to Phenomenology, ‘Chapter 3 Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900–1901)’, ‘The six investigations and the 
“breakthrough” to pure phenomenology’ (pp. 105–109) and ‘Chapter 4 Husserl’s Discovery of the 
Reduction and Transcendental Phenomenology’ (pp. 124–163), esp. p. 124. 
18 At the time of their publication the connection between the two volumes did cause controversy as 
some had thought that Husserl, because of his descriptive[-eidetic]-psychological approach in the 
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between ‘categorial and sensuous intuition’ is of importance to Husserl’s efforts of 
clarifying the nature of logical propositions and the features of a possible logical 
consciouenss as such. It thus takes its point of departure, as Husserl explicitly states, 
from a meditation on Kant’s dictum ‘Being is not a real predicate’, 
 
The form-giving flexion Being, whether in its attributive or predictive function, is not 
fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. We here remember Kant’s dictum: Being is no real 
predicate. This dictum refers to being qua existence, or to what Herbart called the being of 
‘absolute position’, but it can be taken to be not less applicable to predicative and 
attributive being. In any case it precisely refers to what we are trying to make clear here (was 
wir hier klarlegen wollen). I can see colour, but not being-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but 
not being-smooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something is sounding. Being is not in 
the object [of any possible or actual act of sense knowledge], no part of it, no moment 
tenanting it, no quality or intensity of it, no figure of it or no internal form whatsoever, no 
constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing attaching to an 
object: as it is no real (reales) internal feature, so also it is no real external feature, and 
therefore not, in the real sense, a ‘feature’ (kein ‘Merkmal’) at all. For it has nothing to do 
with the real forms of unity which bind objects [of possible knowledge] into more 
comprehensive objects, tones into harmonies, things into more comprehensive things or 
arrangements of things (gardens, streets, the phenomenal external world). Of these real 
forms of unity the external features of objects, the right and the left, the high and the low, 
the loud and the soft etc., are founded. Among these anything like an ‘is’ is naturally not to 
be found.
19  
 
This clarification of the meaning of ‘Being’ re-echoes Kant’s negative thesis, then, 
that ‘Being’ must not be treated as a real predicate that adds anything to one’s actual 
understanding or knowledge of anything that is. It is, rather, only in a categorial 
judgement about a true state-of-affairs, ‘gold is yellow’, that the ‘is’, Husserl notes, is 
given, but here (this categorical intuition of Being) it is not understood as a 
predicate of any real object of sensuous intuition (that is, of sense judgment). This, 
however, is not, at least primarily, Heidegger’s concern at all in Being and Time (or in 
any of his other work). None of these descriptive-psychological clarifications by 
Husserl of Kant’s thesis ‘Being is not a real predicate’ can yield any positive clue 
about why Heidegger raises ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, in the way he 
does in Being and Time, in relation to ‘Dasein’ and to that being’s understanding of 
temporality. This clue, then, that Heidegger offers to us to understand the direct 
philosophical connection between Husserl’s distinction between ‘categorial and 
sensuous intuition’ and ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to 
Dasein is as fraught with obscurity as it is open to speculative interpretation, 
notwithstanding the investigative work undertaken by Jacques Taminiaux and 
others on this very issue.20 
 
second volume (1901), had fallen back into the psychologism that he had refuted in the first volume 
(1900). See, Heidegger, ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, p. 74–76:81–84. One hundred years later, 
this dispute over the relationship between the two volumes is still not resolved for some 
commentators and critics of Husserl’s work. Cf., Moran, ‘Introduction’, in Husserl, The Shorter Logical 
Investigations (2001), p. lxxi, n. 1, and p. lxxv, n. 50. 
19 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, LI, VI, ch.3, §43., pp. 780–78.  
20 In ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, Heidegger recalls that when Husserl came to Freiburg 
University in 1916 to take up the chair in philosophy, there was still a considerable amount of 
interest in the Logical Investigations (1900–01), particularly in the Sixth Logical Investigation which was 
out of print. Hence, Heidegger remarks, ‘we — friends and pupils — begged the master [Husserl] 
again and again to republish the sixth investigation which was then difficult to obtain. True to his 
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In Husserl’s later celebrated reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-
phenomenological attitude in Ideas I (1913), Husserl does, however, explicitly focus on 
the issue of the meaning of Being and on our ‘talk of Being’ (Seinsrede) in relation to 
‘Being as thing’ (Sein als Ding) given to one’s own actual consciousness of the world 
via thing-perception and the meaning of ‘Being as (conscious) experience’ (Sein als 
Erlebnis) given to consciousness via inner perception.21 In this respect, Heidegger is 
quite correct to see remnants of the modern programme of philosophy, initiated by 
‘Descartes, Kant and Fichte’, being carried on by Husserl in the transcendental 
reduction of Ideas I, but this should not detract from the fact that in the 
transcendental reduction Husserl is both explicitly and directly engaged in clarifying 
our ‘talk of Being’ (notwithstanding the parameters and confines of that 
philosophical meditation).22 At any rate, Heidegger himself, in Being and Time, claims 
 
dedication to the cause of phenomenology, the publisher Niemeyer published the last chapter of the 
Logical Investigations again in 1922. Husserl notes in the preface: “As things stand, I had to give in to 
the wishes of the friends of this work and decide to make the last chapter available again in its old 
form.” With the phrase “friends of this work,” Husserl also wanted to say that he himself could not 
quite get close to the Logical Investigations after the publication [in 1913] of the Ideas [I]’ (p. 78–79). 
Note Heidegger praises the publisher, ‘true to his dedication to the cause of phenomenology’, for the 
re-issue of the Sixth Logical Investigation. Heidegger, nonetheless, remained interested in Husserl’s 
texts in phenomenology, including Ideas I, for, as Kisiel informs us, when at Marburg University 
(1924–1928) Heidegger received from Husserl in February 1925 his unpublished manuscript of Ideen 
II (dealing with ‘naturalistic’ and ‘personalistic consciousness’, ‘nature and spirit’) which ‘seems to 
have driven Heidegger’, in his preparation for his Summer Semester 1925 Lecture course, ‘to a 
renewed detailed examination of Husserl’s work, especially the Sixth Logical Investigation, the 
[1910–11] Logos-essay and Ideas I.’ Theodore Kisiel, ‘On the Way to Being and Time: Introduction to 
the Translation of Heidegger’s Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitsbegriffs,’ in Kisiel, Heidegger’s Way of 
Thought. Critical and Interpretative Signposts (London & New York: Continuum, 2002), ed. by Alfred 
Dunker & Marion Heinz, pp. 36–63 (p. 38). We cannot conclude from this, however, that Heidegger 
is endeavouring to develop any of Husserl’s actual position(s) or philosophical tenets elaborated in 
any of these works (in whatever way Husserl’s analyses are to be understood) in Heidegger’s own 
particular development of ‘phenomenology’ in Being and Time (or in earlier or later works, lecture-
courses, or seminars). For remarks towards this, nevertheless, cf., Dermot Moran, ‘Heidegger’s 
Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality’, Inquiry, 43 (2000), 39–66 (p. 58) and 
cf., also, Sebastian Luft, ‘Husserl’s Concept of the “Transcendental Person”: Another Look at the 
Husserl–Heidegger Relationship’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13 (2005), 141–77. 
21 See, Ideas I, Part Two: The Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology, §§ 27–55. 
22 In the reduction in Ideas I, then, Husserl is not addressing the experiences of a valid normative 
logical consciousness as such as he did in the Logical Investigations. In the Logical Investigations Husserl is 
already subscribing to a form of Kantian two domainism, acknowledging the experiences of a valid 
normative consciousness as such and factual-natural consciousness, though the latter is not part of 
his logical considerations. ‘(F)rom the standpoint of the intention, the notion of the relationship of 
self-evidence yields us truth as the rightness of our intention (and especially that of our judgement), its 
adequacy to its true object, or the rightness of the intention’s epistemic essence in specie. We have, in the latter 
regard, the rightness, e.g., of the judgement in the logical sense of the proposition: the proposition 
“directs” itself to the thing itself, it says that it is so, and it really is so. In this we have the expression 
of the ideal, and therefore general, possibility that a proposition of such and such a “matter” admits 
of fulfilment in the sense of the most rigorous adequation’. Logical Investigations, Logical Investigation, 
IV, ‘§39 Self-evidence and truth’, p. 766. For Husserl, ‘the thing itself’ that a valid logical 
consciousness as such is ‘directed towards’, is the eidos of the logical act of judgement, not any 
empirical, factual psychological judgement. Thus no where is Husserl closer to Kant than at the time 
of his writing of the Logical Investigations. Heidegger glosses over this point in ‘My Way into 
Phenomenology’, but this is probably more due to memory-loss as he is thoroughly aware of this in 
his early lecture courses. See, his 1925 Summer Lecture-Course at Marburg, History of the Concept of 
Time: Prolegomena, trans. by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); 
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to be advancing Husserl’s later conception of transcendental phenomenology towards 
‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its ‘innermost’ (eigenst) relationship to 
Dasein’s ‘understanding of Being’ (Seinsverständnis). What Heidegger is challenging in 
Being and Time, therefore, is not the cogency of Husserl’s position per se in Ideas I, but 
the exclusivity of the version of transcendental phenomenology (qua transcendental 
idealism) that is defended as the one and only version of transcendental 
phenomenology. About Husserl’s concept of transcendental phenomenology (and 
Scheler’s development of phenomenology), Heidegger remarks that ‘the critical 
question cannot stop here’.23 Far from rejecting Husserl’s concept of transcendental 
phenomenology (or Scheler’s phenomenology), Heidegger, rather, wishes to explore 
another issue regarding ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to 
Dasein as his contribution to transcendental phenomenology in Being and Time, even 
if Husserl himself simply did not (and could not) see this as a continuation of any of 
his own ideas for transcendental phenomenology. 
In the following section of this article, therefore, I wish to draw attention 
back to Husserl’s transcendental reduction in relation to Heidegger’s subsequent 
interest in ‘the question of the meaning of Being’. It is, after all, only in the 
transcendental reduction where the topic of Husserl’s phenomenology is ‘the 
meaning of Being’. Furthermore, the way Husserl addresses this topic, in the 
reduction, is new in the history of thought.24 It can, therefore, only have been 
sometime after the publication of Ideas I, and after his reading of the transcendental 
reduction in particular, that Heidegger could have seen that there is an issue left 
‘forgotten’ or ‘unthought’ concerning ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in the 
development of Husserl’s own philosophy, but one that can also become (for him) the central 
topic in phenomenology and for phenomenological research to address, albeit in a 
radically new and different direction to the manner in which Husserl addresses this 
topic in the reduction.25 Whilst Husserl’s reduction of the natural attitude to the 
 
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, GA Vol. 20, ed. by Petra Jaeger (1979), where he deals 
specifically (§11) with Husserl’s reduction in Ideas I and does not gloss over the fact that the 
reduction in Ideas I radicalizes, in the development of Husserl’s own thought, his earlier Kantian 
position into some version of post Kantian-transcendental idealism. 
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 73:48. 
24 In his Winter Lecture Course of 1907–1908, Husserl applies, for the first time, descriptive-eidetic 
analyses to the way in which we understand the meaning of Being as thing given to actual acts of 
outer perceptual-sense experience and the meaning of Being as (conscious) experience given in 
reflective, immanent perception, and arrives at conclusions that bring about his ‘conversion’ to 
transcendental idealism (and which he later (in)famously publishes in Ideas I (1913)). Thus it was 
around 1907–1908 that Husserl recognised a major difference between the ‘rational (descriptive-
eidetic) psychology’ of his former position in the Logical Investigations and ‘transcendental 
phenomenology’, and makes a [second] breakthrough in understanding philosophy as ‘transcendental 
phenomenology’. See, Theodore De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. by Theodore 
Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 323, n. 7. 
25 Being and Time, ‘Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being,’ p. 2:2: ‘Die 
genannte Frage ist heute in Vergessenheit gekommen’. Cf., also, Heidegger’s later remarks in ‘The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, where he informs his reader, taking his cue from 
Husserl’s (and Hegel’s) call (Ruf) to go back ‘to the thing itself’: ‘We have chosen a discussion of the 
call “to the thing itself” (“zur Sache selbst”) as our guideline (als Wegweiser). It was to bring us to the 
path (auf den Weg) which leads us to a determination of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. 
[…]  From the perspective of Hegel and Husserl — and not only from their perspective — the 
matter of philosophy ((D)ie Sache der Philosophie) is subjectivity. It is not the matter as such that is 
controversial for the call, but rather its presentation (ihre Darstellung) by which the matter itself 
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transcendental-phenomenological attitude has long been recognised as the crux 
interpretum of Husserl’s later position in phenomenology, for us, it must become a 
crux interpretum of Heidegger’s departure from that position, though this is seldom 
recognised, or addressed by commentators and critics of the Husserl-Heidegger 
philosophical relationship, or indeed one to which Heidegger himself appears to 
give much (due) notice.26 It is of importance to see, nonetheless, how Heidegger’s 
concentration on ‘being-for-death’ calls into question both the confines and the 
parameters that Husserl set around his ‘talk of Being’ in transcendental reduction 
and re-opens the question of the meaning of Being in our ‘talk of Being’ from 
within the reduction itself. 
A complicating factor in understanding Heidegger’s analysis of authentic 
and inauthentic thinking about death in Being and Time, however, is that in that 
analysis Heidegger appears to deploy a distinction that Husserl had made earlier in 
the Sixth Logical Investigation between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’. The 
theme of authentic and inauthentic existence and the topic of death, of course, are 
ones that are found discussed outside of Husserlian texts in phenomenology, and 
more in existentialist writers, poets, religious thinkers, all of whom and in whom 
Heidegger was well versed throughout his early career in philosophy. The central 
distinction that Heidegger operates in Being and Time between authentically seeing 
the meaning of one’s own death and inauthentically talking about the death of 
another human being is not, nevertheless, found in any of the ‘existentialists’ 
thinkers that Heidegger mentions in Being and Time. This distinction is more 
recognisable against the backdrop of Husserl’s distinction between authentic and 
inauthentic thinking in the Sixth Logical Investigation; or, at least, so shall I argue in 
section three of this article. In this final section of our article, therefore, it will be 
necessary to reconstruct the central features of this distinction and Heidegger’s 
critique of that distinction that are relevant to an understanding and evaluation of 
Heidegger’s position in philosophy and phenomenological research. Heidegger’s 
critique of Husserl’s distinction, nonetheless, amounts in effect to a dismantling of 
the very foundations of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology that was initially 
presented in the Logical Investigations and developed further by him in the 
transcendental-phenomenological ontology of the reduction in Ideas I. We can thus 
readily understand why Husserl is correct to see, much to his own disappointment 
and incomprehension in 1929, both overt and covert criticisms of his own 
philosophical position in Being and Time by its author. This does not mean that 
Heidegger is not indebted to Husserl’s phenomenology. On the contrary, we will 
note that though Husserl misunderstands Heidegger’s effort in Being and Time as 
 
becomes present. […] The two methods [of Hegel and Husserl] are as different as they could 
possibly be. But the matter as such, which they are to present, is the same, although it is experienced 
in different ways. But of what help are these discoveries to us in our attempt to bring the task of 
thinking to view?  They don’t help us at all as long as we do not go beyond a mere discussion of the 
call and ask what remains unthought (ungedacht) in the call “to the thing itself.”  Questioning in this way, we 
can become aware how something which it is no longer the matter of philosophy to think conceals 
itself (sich etwas verbirgt) precisely where philosophy has brought its matter (inwiefern gerade dort, wo die 
Philosophie ihre Sache […] gebracht hat) to absolute knowledge and to ultimate evidence (ins absolute 
Wissen und zur letztgültigen Evidenz).’ pp. 55–73 (p. 63–64:70–71, my emphases).  
26 An exception to this is Courtine, ‘Réduction phénoménologique-transcendantale et différence 
ontico-ontologique’, in Jean-François Courtine, Heidegger et la phénoménologie (Paris: Vrin, 1990), pp. 
207–247. 
 95  
falling back into the natural attitude, Being and Time is a work in phenomenology 
precisely because it is committed to determining the intelligibility of the meaning of 
finitude from within the particularity of that experience itself in our ‘talk of Being’ 
outside of the ‘talk of Being’ that dominates and prescribes the meaning of Being 
for anyone living in the natural attitude.27 Heidegger, in other words, elaborates a 
different conception of transcendental phenomenology to Husserl’s, but it is still a 
conception of transcendental phenomenology, though it is one that cannot be 
entered into or retrieved via Husserl’s particular transcendental reduction. This, 
then, is why commentators, like Carman, find it ‘difficult to say exactly what the 
nature and scope of his [Husserl’s] influence on Heidegger amounted to in the end’, 
but this is no justification for avoiding addressing this controversial and central 
issue in Heidegger’s early philosophy. 
 
II 
HUSSERL’S ‘TALK OF BEING’ IN IDEAS I AND 
HEIDEGGER’S ‘QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING’ IN BEING AND TIME 
 
One of the most important and controversial conclusions that Husserl reaches in 
his reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological 
attitude in Ideas I is that one’s own actual consciousness can and would continue to 
exist, even if the entire world of things, including oneself as a being in that world, 
were annihilated. This, Husserl demonstrates, though enacting his (in)famous 
‘world-annihilation repeatable thought-experiment’ in Ideas I.28 And it is this notion 
of an isolatable, pure, disembodied intentional consciousness that probably came 
most under attack by the majority of Husserl’s critics and ‘followers’ of his 
phenomenological conception of philosophy. Heidegger, however, does not deny in 
Being and Time that complete reduction to pure intentional consciousness and its 
objectivities is a possibility for phenomenology and phenomenological research. He, 
in fact, acknowledges such a possibility in Being and Time;29and he had already 
remarked to his student in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course, with respect 
to Husserl’s discovery of ‘pure consciousness’ in the transcendental reduction, that 
the ‘difficulty does not concern the determination of the region as such, the characterisation of 
 
27 Here Heidegger appropriates, at least in part, Dilthey’s stress on ‘hermeneutic retrieval’ as an 
essential methodological concern in any phenomenological approach to the significances of particular 
life experiences documented in literature. This includes ‘talk of Being’ from a lived point of view, 
however this has been documented in the history of thought, or in the history of our daily lives. 
Thus it is not without due regard to Dilthey’s approach that Heidegger explicitly tells his students in 
his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course that ‘Dilthey brought with him [by comparison to Husserl, 
as is evident from the context] an original understanding of phenomenology, and that he influenced 
it in the direction which concerns us [Heidegger].’ Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 117, my 
emphasis. 
28 Husserl, Ideas I, § 49. Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the 
World’. 
29 Though Heidegger does not tell his reader in Being and Time that he is referring to Husserl’s 
reduction in ‘The Fundamental Consideration’ of Ideas I, it is to this very text that Heidegger is 
alluding when he singles out the apodictic proof of the existence of consciousness in reflective 
immanent perception and the ‘givenness’ of a ‘reflective awareness of the “I”’, to make the point, as 
an aside, that ‘this kind of giving (diese Art von Gebung)’ and ‘this insight (diese Einsicht) even affords 
access to a phenomenological problematic in its own right (eigenständigen), and has in principle 
(grundsätzliche)  the signification of providing a framework (rahmengebende) as a “formal 
phenomenology of consciousness”.’ Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 151:115. 
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pure consciousness’.30 Thus Heidegger is not maintaining what Merleau-Ponty 
famously and later suggested that complete reduction to pure consciousness is 
impossible because, appealing to Heidegger’s insistence, we exist as ‘being-in-the-
world’.31 Heidegger’s argument against Husserl, rather, is that there is a further 
possibility, after the reduction has been implemented and enacted, for 
phenomenology and phenomenological research to concern itself with, namely, ‘the 
question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to Dasein. Heidegger, in other 
words, develops his thinking about ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ after the 
reduction has been completed. It is of importance, therefore, to give attention to 
those aspects of Husserl’s transcendental reduction that are relevant to an 
understanding and evaluation of Heidegger’s departure from that reduction.  
Husserl characterises his reduction in Ideas I as a genuine return to ‘talk of 
Being’. More specifically, the reduction in Ideas I is a comparative meditation on the 
meaning of ‘Being as thing’ given to outer sense perception and the meaning of 
‘Being as (conscious) experience’ given to inner perception. In the reduction, the 
world is also understood by Husserl as simply the totality of things that can be 
encountered via outer perceptual-sense experience. From a phenomenological point 
view, however, it follows that if an individual thing given to outer perceptual-sense 
experience depends upon the harmony of one’s actual perceptions of that thing for 
the latter to show itself in its very existence, so, too, by extension, does the entire 
world of things given to one’s own actual consciousness.32 Thus the world, in its 
true manner of being and appearing, turns out to be an intentional correlate of 
one’s own actual consciousness. If, however, we compare the outer perceptual-
sense experience of things given to our actual consciousness with the awareness 
that is characteristic of an act of reflective, immanent perception of an experience 
we obtain, Husserl argues, a very different understanding of Being in relation to 
being as (conscious) experience. 
In his analysis of consciousness in Ideas I Husserl makes a very important 
distinction between acts within consciousness that are transcendentally directed and 
acts that are immanently directed. Unlike an act of transcendent perception that 
occurs within consciousness, such as, for instance, an act of recollection, which 
posits the existence of its object, a remembered item, sometimes correctly and 
sometimes not so correctly, an act of reflective immanent perception posits 
knowledge of the existence of its object, the current (conscious) experience, without 
 
30 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 112, my emphasis. 
31 Cf., Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Preface’, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, 1978), pp. xiii–xiv. 
32 In his well-known and often quoted ‘Preface’ to his Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-
Ponty accepts Husserl’s point (apodictic argument) that the individual thing is relative to the 
harmony of one’s actual perceptual experiences of that thing, but the existence of the world is not. 
He can only do this, however, by having a different concept of the ‘world’ to the one that Husserl is 
talking about in his reduction. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is ‘a background’, a ‘horizon’ against 
which individual things emerge and fall back into and thus an ‘immense individual against which my 
experiences unfolds and which dwells at the horizon of my life, just as the noise of a great city forms 
the background of all that we do there’ (ibid., p. 378, and see, p. 362). It is ‘a closely woven fabric [...] 
[that] does not await our judgement before incorporating the most surprising phenomena, or before 
rejecting the most plausible figments of our imagination’ (ibid., p. x). From this point of view, 
therefore, it is not surprising that individual things can come into being and go out of being, but the 
‘world’ as ‘horizon’ remains inalienable and indubitably posited. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty,‘(T)here is 
absolute certainty about the world in general, but not about any thing in particular’ (ibid., p. 344). 
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any shadow of doubt. It is not necessary, for instance, that a remembered 
experience exists, but it is necessary that an experience, immanently perceived, 
exists.33 Though limited strictly to the present, reflective immanent perception, 
nonetheless, is infallible in guaranteeing its knowledge of the existence (die Existenz) 
of its object.34  
The non-existence of an experience immanently perceived, therefore, is 
unthinkable, and it is unthinkable ‘not’, as Husserl had already remarked in the 
Logical Investigations, ‘in the subjective [psychological-factual] sense of an incapacity 
to represent-things-otherwise, but in the objectively-ideal necessity of an inability-
to-be-otherwise.’35 In the reflective immanent perception of an experience, what we 
encounter is not merely factual-assertoric certainty ‘that a psychical act exist’ (as 
Brentano held in his 1874 study Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint),36 but 
apodictic certainty regarding knowledge of the existence of an experience.37 Husserl 
draws important implications from this in his famous argument for the ‘absolute’ 
existence of being as experience (Sein als Erlebnis) in comparison to the ‘relative’ 
existence of ‘being as thing’ (Sein als Ding) given to outer perceptual-sense 
experience in his famous ‘reduction’ of the ‘natural attitude’ to the ‘transcendental-
phenomenological attitude’, but we can set this aside for the moment. Because 
Husserl, nonetheless, provides apodictic arguments in support of his 
phenomenological elucidation of the meaning of ‘Being as thing’ given to outer 
perceptual-sense experience and the meaning of ‘Being as (conscious) experience’ 
given to reflective immanent perception, Husserl was convinced that he had not 
only clarified but answered, once and for all, in and through his philosophical-
 
33 Thus de Boer remarks, ‘we can see why Husserl distinguishes within the sphere of immanently 
directed acts between immanent perception and other immanently directed acts such as 
remembering of an “experience”. It is possible for the remembered experience not to exist. In 
memory no absolute positing is possible. Only in immanent perception is absolute positing possible.’ 
The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 345. 
34 That the very mode of being of that which is given to our experiences is guaranteed on the basis 
of some identifiable, perceptually-founded act(s) is of crucial importance to Husserl’s idea of a 
phenomenological philosophy because, otherwise, there would be no justification for any 
phenomenological approach to experience, as Husserl defines that approach. Not all of Husserl’s so-
called followers, however, agreed with Husserl on this point. The act of reflective, immanent 
perception, nonetheless, is of particular importance to Husserl in that it guarantees, apodictically, the 
very existence of its object, namely, psychical act-experiences and their objects (if they exist). 
35 ‘What cannot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be, cannot be thought — this equivalence fixes 
the differences between the pregnant notion of thinking and the ordinary subjective sense of 
presentation and thought. […]  Wherever therefore the word “can” occurs in conjunction with the 
pregnant use of “think”, there is a reference, not to a subjective necessity, i.e. to the subjective 
incapacity-to-represent-things-otherwise, but to the objectively-ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-
otherwise.’ Husserl, Logical Investigations, pp. 445–446. 
36 Cf., Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D.B. 
Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), p. 141: 
‘(I)n the case of cognition through inner perception, what we perceive is that a psychical act exists’ 
(my emphasis).  And earlier, Brentano writes: ‘(F)or whether or not there are souls, the fact is that 
there are psychical phenomena [as evidently presented through inner perception].’ Ibid., p. 18–19. 
37 ‘Every perception of something immanently perceived guarantees the existence (die Existenz) of its 
object. If reflective experience is directed towards my experience, I have seized something absolute 
in itself, the factual being (Dasein [not in Heidegger’s sense of this term]) of which is essentially 
incapable of being negated, i.e., the insight that it is essentially impossible for it not to exist; it would 
be a countersense (ein Widersinn, a non-sense) to believe it possible that an experience given in that 
manner (so gegebenes) does not in truth exist’. Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 96–97:85. 
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transcendental reduction, the question of the meaning of Being in any of our ‘talk 
of Being’ (Seinsrede)’ that was relevant to his conception and elaboration of 
phenomenology as a study of intentional consciousness and its objectivities.38 In 
this respect, Heidegger is quite correct to point out and stress to his students in his 
1925 Summer Semester Lecture Course that with the transcendental reduction ‘the 
question of [the meaning of] being is thus raised, it is even answered [by Husserl]’.39 It is, 
however, precisely because ‘the question of [the meaning of] being’ is answered by 
Husserl that this question, as Heidegger also points out, is ‘no longer’ a question for 
Husserl.40 It was, nonetheless, for that, a question for Husserl in the transcendental 
reduction, irrespective of the answer that he unfurled in and through his eidetic 
analysis of ‘thing-perception’ and of ‘experience immanently perceived’. In this 
regard, then, we can understand Heidegger’s claim that ‘the question of (the 
meaning of) Being’ is a question that remains at the core of Husserl’s philosophical 
considerations and composition of the reduction of the natural attitude to the 
transcendental-phenomenological attitude. It is also, as Heidegger is well aware of 
and stresses to his students in his 1925 lecture-course, a question that can be re-
enacted and retrievable (wiederholbar), but only in and through the repeatable 
thought-experiment of the reduction and eidetic analyses. ‘It is the essence of 
phenomenological investigations’, Heidegger insists, ‘that they cannot be reviewed 
summarily but in each case must be rehearsed and repeated anew.’41 In this respect, 
 
38 This means, for Heidegger, that the question no longer is a question for Husserl; hence, the 
question of the meaning of Being in phenomenology becomes ‘un-thought in the sense that it becomes 
undone by Husserl in and through his transcendental reduction). 
39 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 112. 
40 My emphasis. See, History of the Concept of Time, esp., Chapter Three ‘The Early Development of 
Phenomenological Research and the Necessity of a Radical Reflection in and from Itself’. As well as 
the suppression of the question of the meaning of Being through the reduction, the conclusion of 
the reduction renders the existing human being ‘no longer regarded in its concrete individuation and 
its tie to a living being’ (p. 106). Thus, from his analysis of the reduction, Heidegger explicitly 
concludes two neglects by Husserl at the end of Chapter Three, succinctly captured by the title of his 
§13 ‘Exposition of the Neglect of the Question of the Sense of Being itself and of the Being of Man 
in Phenomenology’. 
41 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 26. By focusing on and clarifying the mode of being as 
thing given to outer perceptual-sense experience and being as (conscious) experience in his ‘talk of 
Being’ as the only relevant ‘talk of Being’ in his definition of transcendental phenomenology, Husserl 
missed out entirely on the significance of the meaning of the facticity of ‘Dasein’ in any ‘talk of 
Being’. It is one of Heidegger’s main bones of contention in this Summer Semester 1925 lecture-
course that Husserl’s reduction excludes, aprioristically, ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its 
relation to ‘Dasein’. Husserl, however, explicitly complains about commentators and critics 
confusing the transcendental reduction with the eidetic reduction, and believed Heidegger was one 
of these too. ‘I also note that you too, following the suggestions of Scheler and Heidegger, see me as 
a Platonist or (which comes down to the same thing) and you confuse the [transcendental] 
phenomenological reduction with the eidetic reduction. No one seems to think it necessary to read 
and take seriously what I say about the reduction. […] I am further way from Platonism and every a 
prioristic ontologism than any past or present philosophy — incomparably further even than Dilthey.’ 
Husserl, ‘March 28, 1934 Edmund Husserl to Julius Stenzel (draft)’, in M. Heidegger, Becoming 
Heidegger: On the Trail of His Occasional Writings, 1910–1927, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas 
Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 414–415. Heidegger, however, does 
not confuse these two operations in Husserl’s philosophy, but many commentators and critics do, as 
Husserl notes. The confusion of Husserl’s exceptionally clear and distinct doctrines of descriptive-
psychological-eidetic analysis and the transcendental reduction is compounded further by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s later and highly influential, but highly inaccurate commentary on Husserl’s eidetic 
reduction and Heidegger’s ‘facticity of Dasein’ as proving the impossibility of complete reduction to 
 
 99  
‘the thing itself’ (die Sache selbst) that concerns both Husserl in the reduction and 
Heidegger (later) in Being and Time is the issue of the meaning of Being.  
If we follow Husserl in his reduction, we can evidently see, after the 
reduction is completed, that the very appearing of the world (that is to say, of the 
totality of things given to outer perceptual-sense experience) in its existence is 
contingent upon consciousness, whereas one’s actual consciousness is not 
dependent for its existence on the world.42 My actual consciousness, in other words, 
can never depend upon, nor append itself to a material thing (a corporeal body) in 
order to exist precisely because material things depend upon consciousness to exist. 
Thus my actual consciousness is the true ‘ontic presupposition’ (Seinsvoraussetzung) of 
the world for Husserl, and not the material thing of nature as held and hailed in the 
natural attitude.43  
In the natural attitude (as Husserl defines it), in perception we assume 
things to be simply there, lying present-in-stock (vorhanden), with an essential 
meaning and an independent existence in order for us to come to know what they 
are via outer perceptual-sense experiences.44 This very standpoint overlooks, 
however, the simple phenomenological fact that such things could not and do not 
appear, in their very mode of being, to my actual consciousness without the 
harmony of one’s actual intentional experiences of things in and of that world. 
Consciousness appears first and the world of things appears secondly. This must be 
understood from a Kantian transcendental point of view, that is to say, 
consciousness is revealed in and through the reduction as a necessary (pre-
)condition for the possibility of the appearing of the world of things in their very 
being to the actual experiencing subject. After the reduction is completed, therefore, there 
is no ‘thing in itself’ that is left over or outside of its parameters; or, perhaps more 
accurately stated, there is no intelligible or sensible talk about that which is in-itself, 
except, perhaps, about consciousness itself in its being, which is not a thing.45 ‘Thus’, 
Husserl concludes, ‘the meaning of our talk of being (der gemeine Sinn der Seinsrede) is 
exactly the opposite of what it ordinarily is (So kehrt sich [...] um).’ Things are not 
encountered through our acts of outer perceptual-sense experience as hailed and held 
in the natural attitude; they are constituted, rather, in their very meaning and being, in 
and through the harmony of one’s actual intentional experiences. Absence of such 
 
‘pure consciousness’ in his famous 1945 ‘Preface’ of his Phénoménologie de la perception, that is still so 
often quoted (with approval) by many commentators (for example, cf., Moran, An Introduction to 
Phenomenology (2000), pp. 160–161). See, De Boer’s critical remarks on Merleau-Ponty’s commentary 
on Husserl’s notion of the reduction in The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 470–471, n. 24. 
42 ‘Over against the positing of the world, which is “contingent” positing, there stands then the 
positing of my pure Ego and Ego-life which is a “necessary,” absolutely indubitable positing. […] 
This is the eidetic law defining this necessity and that contingency.’ (Ideas I, pp. 102–103:86) Thus 
Husserl concludes Chapter Two of Part Two of Ideas I, noting that here, ‘(O)ur considerations have 
now succeeded in reaching a point of culmination’ (ibid.). The rest of what follows is an elaboration 
of what has been achieved. See, Rudolf Boehm, ‘Husserl’s Concept of the “Absolute”’, in The 
Phenomenology of Husserl, Selected Critical Readings, trans. and ed. by R. O. Elveton (Seatle: 
Noesis, 2nd edn, 2000), pp. 164–191 (p. 169). 
43 De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, pp. 356–357. 
44 Husserl, Ideas I, Part Two, §27. ‘The World of the Natural Attitude: I and My Surrounding World’. 
45 Ibid., p. 100:85. The fact that the entire world of things could only appear to me in its very being 
through the harmony (Zusammenhang) of my actual consciousness of the world, however,  is 
‘inconspicuous [unseen] and unheeded’, when one is living in the natural attitude; see, ibid., 
corresponding n. 215, inserted in Copy D. 
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harmony of experience would not, nevertheless, lead to nothingness because, from 
a dialectical point of view, absence of unity implies not nothing but multiplicity, that 
is, a series of unconnected intentional experiences that do not produce a world — 
but the experiences would exist. Thus, as the repeatable thought-experiment 
demonstrates, consciousness (experience itself) would continue to exist as a 
residuum, even if the entire world of things ‘no longer’ existed for consciousness — 
such a consciousness would just not be a consciousness of the world as we know it. 
‘The existence of a Nature [therefore] cannot be the condition for the existence of 
consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness: 
Nature is only as being constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness.’ 46 
Through the reduction, then, Husserl reaches at least part of the conclusion that 
he has been striving to obtain, namely, that the harmony of the experiences of one’s 
own actual consciousness is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the very 
appearing of a meaningful world (of things) in their very existence given to outer 
perceptual-sense experience.47 By comparison to the relative (presumptive) mode of 
being of the world of things given to acts of outer perceptual-sense experience, 
consciousness, as revealed in and through Husserl’s famous world-annihilation 
thought experiment, can exist in its being (so-sein) absolutely as that-which-is (als 
Seiendes)  in itself. This, for Husserl, is beyond doubt; but this can only be seen 
outside of the standpoint of ‘the natural attitude’ and from inside the standpoint of 
the ‘transcendental-phenomenological attitude’. This turning away by Husserl from 
any implicit or explicit natural ‘understanding of Being’ at a fictional metabasis of all 
‘natural ontology’, and his turning towards a transcendental-phenomenological 
ontology — which occurred in Husserl’s thought (around 1907–08) and which took 
most, if not all, of his early so-called realist-eidetic followers by great surprise and 
with much dismay — therefore, is of crucial significance to the development of 
Husserl’s view of philosophy and phenomenological research. This ‘conversion’ in 
Husserl’s’ own thought, nonetheless, overcomes not just the naturalization of ideas 
characteristic of the experiences of a valid logical consciousness as such, but the 
reification of human consciousness itself.48 From this point of view, Ideas I, 
 
46 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 116: 96. Husserl’s argument would be conclusive, if the relation between things 
given to outer sense perception and body-perception is identical and one’s own actual embodied 
(incarnate) consciousness is more than a thing. See, De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, 
‘Paragraph Fifteen. Two Assumptions’, pp. 383–386. 
47 The other part is that consciousness can exist without the world (of things), as his repeatable 
world-annihilation thought-experiment demonstrates. 
48 In Volume One of the Logical Investigations (1900) Husserl addresses the dominant trend towards 
what he later calls in his 1910–1911 Logos article, the ‘naturalisation of ideas’. See, Husserl, ‘Philosophy 
as a Rigorous Science’, in Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. by Quentin 
Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 71–147 (p. 80), my emphasis; ‘Philosophie als strenge 
Wissenschaft’, Logos, 1 (1910–1911), 289–341. Husserl’s turn towards transcendental idealism, 
around 1907–08, however, came as something of a shock and a disappointment to his earlier so-
called ‘realist’ philosophers (who interpreted his defence of the existence of essences or the 
intentionality of outer sense perception as a commitment to ‘realism’). Husserl’s ‘conversion’ to 
transcendental idealism, however, is perfectly consistent with Husserl’s quest for a 
presuppositionless starting point in philosophy because it calls into questions presuppositions that he 
himself had subscribed to earlier in the Logical Investigations, in particular the un-phenomenologically 
justifiable hypothesis of the natural attitude that things, whether attention is directed towards them or 
not, have an absolute meaning and existence.  
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therefore, is a much further radicalization of phenomenology than that that had 
been reached and achieved by Husserl in the Logical Investigations.49 
 From the conclusive point of view that Husserl arrives at in the reduction of Ideas 
I, therefore, we can readily understand why Husserl could not but see any later 
attempt by Heidegger in Being and Time to ‘raise anew’ the question of the meaning of 
Being in phenomenology and phenomenological research as an incomprehensible 
exercise. This, after all, had been accomplished (at least to Husserl’s satisfaction) in 
and through the transcendental reduction. Furthermore, to address this issue of the 
meaning of Being in relation to the way in which a human being is ‘a being-in-the-
world’, as Heidegger appears to do in Being and Time, would be, from Husserl’s 
perspective, tantamount to falling back into the ‘natural attitude’ and to a traditional 
realist-metaphysical way of doing philosophy from within a pre-critical and 
unphenomenologically defensible natural attitude. Thus Heidegger’s thinking in 
Being and Time could not but appear to Husserl as an anthropologistic set back to his 
entire enterprise of advancing a (his) singular new eidetic science of intentional 
consciousness and its objectivities, after consciousness has been purified of all 
naturalistic misunderstandings through the intellectually rigorous therapeutic act of 
transcendental reduction that he had implemented and documented in Ideas I.50 
Heidegger’s depiction of the human being as a being-in-the-world in Being 
and Time, however, is not a fall back into the natural attitude, as Husserl had 
thought, because in his understanding of the human being as a being-in-the-world, 
Heidegger relies on Kierkegaard’s view of ‘existence’ where ‘existence’ is to be 
understood exclusively in the strong existentialist sense of concrete individual human 
existence. Such ‘existence’ is simply incomparable to the way in which things as 
objects of outer perceptual-sense experience (such as, trees, ink-pots, moons, 
monkeys, crowds of fellow human beings even etc.) are presented to human 
consciousness either within the natural attitude as Husserl defines it or within the 
transcendental-phenomenological attitude as Husserl’s defines it. The human being, 
when seen from an existentialist’s point of view, is already outside of the ‘natural 
attitude’. Analysing and subjecting ‘things’ given to outer sense perception and 
‘experiences’ (Erlebnisse) immanently perceived to eidetic analysis and apodictic 
critique simply jumps over the topic of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to 
the way a human being exists (in ‘Dasein’). This is why Heidegger remarks in Being and 
Time, in a veiled but nonetheless direct reference to Husserl’s transcendental 
reduction in Ideas I, that, 
 
The question of Dasein’s basic existential character is essentially different from the 
question of the Being of something lying-present-in-stock (der Frage nach dem Sein eines 
Vorhandenen). Our everyday environmental experiencing (Das alltägliche umweltliche Erfahren), 
which remains directed both ontically and ontologically on innerworldly entities (auf das 
innerweltliche Seiende gerichtet bleibt), is not the sort of thing which can bequeath Dasein in an 
ontically primordial manner (vermag Dasein nicht ontish ursprünglich vorzugeben) for ontological 
analysis (für die ontologische Analyse). In equal manner, the immanent perception of 
 
49 There is still much disagreement among commentators and critics of the continuity and legitimacy 
of Husserl’s development of phenomenology. For a lucid, short and excellent account of this issue, 
see Theodore de Boer, ‘The Meaning of Husserl’s Idealism in the Light of his Development’, trans. 
by H. Pietersma, Analecta Husserliana, 2 (1972), 322–332. 
50 See, Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–
193I), esp., The Amsterdam Lectures, ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’. 
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experiences fails to provide (Imgleichen mangelt […] der immanenten Wahrnehmung von 
Erlebnissen) an ontologically sufficient leading-thread (ein ontologisch zureichender Leitfaden).51  
 
Here, Heidegger is clearly referring to the twin poles of Husserl’s transcendental 
reduction —  innerworldly things given to outer (sense) perception and reflective 
immanent perception of experiences (Erlebnisse) — even though Heidegger does not 
explicitly reference Husserl’s text. This, however, is not a positive rejection of 
Husserl’s position; it is, rather, an acknowledgement that Husserl’s particular 
transcendental-phenomenological approach, from start to finish, and those 
approaches that take their pre-critical starting point from within the natural attitude 
and the ‘thesis’ of the natural attitude focused on innerworldly beings, are not the 
appropriate approaches to ‘see’ the topic in phenomenology and phenomenological research that 
catches Heidegger’s attention. What Heidegger is clearly implying in this passage, then, is 
that he simply can find no methodological help in Husserl’s particular reduction, and in his 
‘Seinsrede’, focused as it is on clarifying ‘the meaning of Being as thing’ given to outer 
sense perception and on ‘the meaning of Being as (conscious) experience’ given in 
reflective immanent perception, for the specific task of raising anew the question of 
the meaning of Being and its relation to the way a human being is aware of its own 
being (in Dasein). This topic of concern for Heidegger in phenomenology and 
phenomenological research simply cannot be found in that (Husserl’s) way.52 Hence 
the issue itself (die Sache selbst) cannot be addressed in the particular phenomenological 
manner of thinking as elaborated by Husserl in and through the reduction. The 
methodological task confronting Heidegger, rather, will involve tapping into ‘the 
understanding of Being’ that is deposited in Dasein, for the purposes of recovering a 
lost and forgotten topic in the history of thought in general and in the 
contemporary development of (Husserlian) phenomenology in particular; namely, 
‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to ‘Dasein’.53   
 
51 Being and Time, p. 226:181-182, trans. mod., my emphasis. Heidegger also claims that the 
phenomenon of the ‘worldhood of the world’ is ‘leapt over’ (ein Überspringen des Phänomens der 
Weltlichkeit zusammengeht) in all ontologies (naive or critical), which have unfolded historically in 
philosophical standpoints that take their cue from reflection on innerworldly entities (p. 93:65). 
52 ‘The “that-it-is” of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it 
(Das Daß der Faktizität wird in einem Anschauen nie vorfindlich).’ Being and Time, p. 174:135. Nevertheless, 
Heidegger retorts, ‘it is […] because the “there” (“das Da”) has already been disclosed in a 
disposition can immanent reflection come across ‘experiences’ at all (‘daß alle immanente Reflexion nur 
deshalb “Erlebnisse” vorfinden k a n n)’ (ibid., p. 175:136, my emphasis). That there are ‘experiences’ and 
that we can come across these experiences through eine Blickwendung in immanent reflective perception is not 
denied by Heidegger, but this very ‘activity’ in human intentional consciousness presupposes, in 
Heidegger’s view, a deeper opening (which Heidegger later, famously and metaphorically called die 
Lichtung) that permits an(y) understanding of Being in Dasein to arrive in the first place. It is this 
more hidden ‘Seinsverständnis’ in ‘Dasein’ that makes the ‘only therefore’ (nur deshalb) possible in the 
possibility of immanent reflection within consciousness, and this, of course, includes reflection on 
things given to outer (sense) perception. Thus the latter will not lead one in the direction of ‘Da-Sein’ 
either.  
53 This is the question that Heidegger is really referring to, when he remarks in the opening line of 
his Introduction to Sein und Zeit, ‘Die genannte Frage ist heute in Vergessenheit gekommen’ (p. 21:2). That 
‘this question’, ‘die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein’, is a not a reference to a desire on the part of the 
author to engage in a retrieval of classical ‘ontology’ or of ‘metaphysics’, is evident from the rest of 
the entire unfinished study of Sein und Zeit, even though Heidegger does stress at the beginning of his 
study that the question he is about to address was originally held as a topic of research for Plato and 
Aristotle, only to fall by the wayside from then on ‘als thematische Frage wirklicher Untersuchung’ (ibid.).  
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The originality of Heidegger’s particular argument that ‘the question of the 
meaning of Being’ must be founded on ‘Dasein’, therefore, can be constructed along 
the following Husserlian-Kantian lines. Being can be questioned as to its meaning, 
only if the human being has some understanding of Being itself. As a matter of fact, 
each and any human being knows that he or she exists, or, as Heidegger puts its, 
each and every human being ‘als Dasein’ is a being that is disclosed in its very being 
through such an understanding of Being. Hence Heidegger’s conclusion follows: 
the question of the meaning of Being will make sense, if and only if grounded in 
Dasein, that is to say, in an understanding of the ‘There’ (Da) of ‘Being’ (Sein) and in 
which I find myself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiendes) in Being. We are 
reminded of Kierkegaard’s point regarding arguing about the existence of anything: 
‘I always reason from existence, not towards existence’.54 Part of Heidegger’s task in 
Being and Time, and throughout the 1920s, therefore, will be to move Husserl’s ‘talk 
of Being’ in Ideas I away from intentional consciousness and its objectivities, and 
towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its innermost relatedness to the 
way I understand myself as an existing being in Dasein.  
By raising an even more fundamental or basic question in Kantian-
Husserlian transcendental phenomenology regarding not merely my ability to reflect 
on and understand the meaning of Being as thing given to outer perceptual-sense 
experience and the meaning of Being as (conscious) experience immanently 
perceived, but on what it is to be a being in being at all for the actual experiencing 
subject in relation to the meaning of Being itself, Heidegger, therefore, believs that 
he is furthering Husserl’s idea of transcendental phenomenology to the ‘fundamental 
ontology’ of Being and Time.55 And it is precisely because Heidegger wishes to follow 
a post Kantian-Husserlian phenomenological approach to ‘ontology’ that he is 
insistent in Being and Time that this issue must be firmly rooted in a legitimating 
human experience. This, we know, Heidegger (famously) finds in the awareness of 
the ‘There (Da)’ of ‘Being (Sein), and in which I find myself implicated as that-
which-is (als Seiendes) in Being, that is to say, in ‘Dasein’, as Heidegger understands 
that term,56 and in that being’s ‘understanding of Being’.57 Thinking the relation 
 
54 See, Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, tr. by David F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1936), p. 31. 
55 Since Husserl held only one definition for phenomenology (as an eidetic science of intentional 
consciousness and its objectivities, after consciousness has been purified via the transcendental 
reduction), not surprisingly, he could not recognise another definition of phenomenology, such as 
the one that Heidegger was providing. Thus Husserl could not see Heidegger’s phenomenological 
credentials. 
56 Thomas Sheehan thinks ‘it is ‘a scandal that forty years after the publication of Being and Time 
Heidegger’s key term Dasein is still usually left in the German’. T. Sheehan, ‘A Paradigm Shift in 
Heidegger Research’, Continental Philosophy Review, 32 (2001), 1–20 (p. 11). It seems to me, however, 
that this hesitancy to ‘translate’ Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ is indicative more of the fact that Heidegger clearly 
wishes to give a particularly unique meaning to the term itself outside of what its normal meaning in 
German is, and this is what makes it so difficult not only to ‘translate’ it ‘properly’ into English or 
into any other language, but to understand it in (normal) German in the first instance. For 
Heidegger, nevertheless, ‘Dasein’ clearly means exclusively the awareness of the ‘there’ (Da) of ‘Being’ 
(Sein), and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiendes) among other beings 
(Seiende) in Being. Thus ‘Dasein’, as Heidegger later says, depicts more of a ‘place’ (‘ein Ort’), 
metaphorically speaking, than of a self-reflective point. Heidegger, ‘The Way Back into the Ground 
of Metaphysics’, in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Meridan, 1956), pp. 206–221; originally composed and published in 1949 as an ‘Introduction’ to the 
fifth reprint of ‘What is Metaphysics?’ (1929). One cannot ignore the point, nonetheless, that such a 
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between this (Dasein) and ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, Heidegger calls, 
‘fundamental ontology’ to distinguish it from Husserl’s transcendental-
phenomenological ontology elaborated in Ideas I. Whereas Heidegger, therefore, can 
recognise Husserl’s version of transcendental phenomenology as an exploration of 
the meaning of Being from a neo-Kantian transcendental-idealist’s philosophical-
phenomenological perspective Husserl cannot recognise Heidegger’s version of 
transcendental phenomenology as fundamental ontology as a legitimate concern 
within Husserl’s  parameters and definition of post-Kantian transcendental phenomenology. 
Heidegger’s position and argument in philosophy and phenomenology in 
Being and Time, nonetheless, is, in many respects, relatively straight forward. It 
amounts to this: it is only in the particularity of the awareness of one’s own death as a limit-
situation (as Jaspers identified) that the entire question of the meaning of Being is re-opened in 
philosophy and phenomenological research, and within the history of philosophy and metaphysics 
itself.58  Thus it is through his selection and attention to the significance of the 
meaning of one’s own death that Heidegger believes that he is legitimately 
advancing a phenomenological conception of philosophy, albeit in a radically new 
manner, whether Husserl recognised this as phenomenology, or not — and, we 
know, Husserl did not. From Heidegger’s perspective, nonetheless, he clearly 
believed in Being and Time that the origin of the meaning of the presence of Being as 
we live it (which is not the tenseless presence of Parmenidean Being) is made 
possible only in and through the awareness of death. Whilst advancing this 
phenomenological approach to the issue of the meaning of Being, Heidegger, 
however, is well aware of the fact that his also challenging the hegemony and basis 
of all Western metaphysical thinking of Being that takes its origins from Parmenides 
to Husserl’s eidetic analyses.  
 That a focus on the experience of death as a sign of temporality and its 
significance in any ‘talk of (the meaning of) Being’ is central to Heidegger’s elaboration 
and definition of phenomenology during the 1920s, up to and including the publication of 
 
meaning for ‘Dasein’ is neither a normal meaning nor a normal usage that any German would 
subscribe to, before, during or after Heidegger. Thus it is probably best left untranslated, but with 
the meaning that Heidegger gives to this term kept in mind. For a note on Heidegger’s use of ‘Dasein’ 
and his hyphenated expression of ‘Da-Sein’, cf., Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 
p. 34–35, n. 17.  
57 In doing this, however, Heidegger reduces and constricts the focus of general metaphysics to his 
particular metaphysics of finitude associated with the ‘to be at all’ of my own being-in-the world. That 
things are at all, including one’s own being, and other human beings, and other living and non-living 
beings, requires a different metaphysical possibility for thought, but it is one that Heidegger 
aprioristically excludes from his conception of philosophy. This possiblity is one that William 
Desmond has taken up in his work. See, his Being and the Between (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1995) and God and the Between (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
58 It is Karl Jaspers whom Heidegger explicitly names and credits in Being and Time as the one and 
only thinker who brought to his attention the crucial point that the anticipation of one’s own death 
acts as a limit-situation in an individual human being’s ‘understanding of Being’ (in Dasein) because 
this awareness unites, from beginning to end, the whole of ‘life-experiences’ of an individual being for 
that individual human being. Being and Time, p. 495, n. vi: 249. See, David Farrell Krell, ‘Toward Sein 
und Zeit: Heidegger’s Early [1919] Review of Jaspers’ ‘Psychologie der Weltanschauungen’, Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology, 6 (1975), 147–156; reprinted as ‘From Existence to Fundamental 
Ontology’, in Krell, Intimations of Mortality (University Park, Pa.,: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1986), pp. 11–26. 
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Being and Time, then, can hardly be denied.59 Throughout this time Heidegger is 
clearly not interested in pursuing either traditional metaphysics or Husserlian 
descriptive-eidetic-psychology, or Husserlian transcendental-idealist 
phenomenology. Of most consequence to Heidegger’s thinking about ‘the meaning 
of Being’ in relation to Husserl’s ‘talk of Being’ in the reduction is the fact, however, 
that the significance of the meaning of one’s own death is simply not capable of 
being approached or elucidated phenomenologically either in terms of ‘Being as 
thing’ given to outer perceptual-sense experience or in terms of ‘Being as 
(conscious) experience’ given to reflective immanent perception, the twin pivots of 
the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological 
attitude in Husserl’s famous ‘talk of Being’ in Ideas I.60 Not surprisingly, therefore, 
we do not and cannot find the topic of death or the distinction that Heidegger 
draws in Being and Time between authentic and inauthentic understandings of death 
in Husserl’s celebrated philosophical reduction in Ideas I, or in Husserl’s earlier two 
volumes of Logical Investigations. The topic of death and the concepts of authentic 
and inauthentic (human) existence, rather, are discussed outside of Husserlian texts in 
phenomenology and outside of Husserl’s new science of intentional consciousness 
and by existentialist thinkers, religious mystics, novelists, playwrights and poets, as 
Heidegger and Husserl well know.61 St Paul, Luther, Calvin, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, 
Jaspers, Dilthey, Simmel and Unger all feature, nonetheless, in Heidegger’s analysis 
of death in Being and Time. In this regard, it would appear that Husserl’s thinking has 
no particular part to play in Heidegger’s analysis of death in Being and Time. Yet the 
main distinction that Heidegger draws between authentic and inauthentic thinking 
echoes an identical distinction that Husserl makes between ‘authentic and 
inauthentic thinking’ in the Sixth Logical Investigation. Though Heidegger does not 
mention this, it seems to me that this distinction between ‘authentic and inauthentic 
thinking’, elaborated in the Sixth Logical Investigation, sets up the very way in which 
the topic of death is both approached and laid out in Being and Time, even more so 
than any of the accounts rendered by existentialist and non-existentialist thinkers 
 
59 Van Buren notes that Heidegger, in his early lecture-courses on the philosophy of religious life 
experiences, originally took the theme of ‘death’ as ‘a motto […] from Luther’s Commentary on Genesis, 
in which he [Luther] describes life as a perpetual cursus ad mortem, which Heidegger will translate in 
his courses and in “Being and Time” as Vorlaufen zum Tode, anticipatory running ahead toward death’. 
J. Van Buren, ‘Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther’, in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His 
Earliest Thought, ed. by John van Buren and Theodore Kisiel (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1994), pp. 159–174 (p. 171). As van Buren correctly remarks, however, ‘by this time [of Being 
and Time (1927)] Heidegger’s Christian theological interests had already been on the wane for a long 
time’ (ibid., p. 174). The all important focus by Heidegger on ‘Vorlaufen zum Tode’ in Being and Time 
now lies in the anticipatory awareness in the present of running ahead-towards-one’s-own-death 
without God and ‘without alibi’, as Sartre would put it; but this means that the theme is taken up by 
Heidegger without the entire context in which its meaning is developed and elaborated in Christian 
thinkers. In Heidegger’s estimation, however, the anticipation of one’s own death — and of one’s 
own death only — gives us direct access to the ‘whole phenomenon of Dasein’. Levinas later calls this 
analysis by Heidegger into question. See, Levinas, God, Death, and Time, trans. by Bettina Bergo 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Dieu, la mort et le temps (Editions Grasses & 
Fasquelle, 1993). 
60 See, Heidegger, History Concept of Time, where the reduction is discussed, and §34 
‘Phenomenological Interpretation of Death as a Phenomenon’.  
61 For an interesting account of the topic of death in medieval thought, see, Michael Dunne, ‘A 
Being-toward-Death — The Vado Mori’, Maynooth Philosophical Papers (2007), ed. by Cyril McDonnell 
(Maynooth: NUIM Department of Philosophy, 2007), pp. 1–16. 
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mentioned (or not mentioned, e.g., Augustine’s reflection on death in Book IV of 
the Confessions) by Heidegger in Being and Time. All of the existentialists and religious 
thinkers that Heidegger mentions in Being and Time, nevertheless, turn out to have 
an ‘inauthentic’ understanding of death in Heidegger’s estimation because they do 
not understand the difference between talking about death of the other (of a friend, 
a nephew, a loved one, or in relation to God as the Absolute Other and creator of 
our being) and seeing the meaning of one’s own death itself — because ‘death is just 
one’s own’, or, at least, so Heidegger believes —62 as unlocking the significance of 
the meaning of Being itself. Heidegger, of course, does not construct his analysis of 
death with specific reference to Husserl’s distinction between ‘authentic and 
inauthentic thinking’ in Being and Time, and I am not suggesting that he either 
consciously or unconsciously avoided informing his reader of the comparative 
nature of his analyses in Being and Time with Husserl’s distinction. For the purposes 
of our inquiry and analysis, however, we will reconstruct Heidegger’s analysis 
philosophically in that fashion in the following and final section of this article. 
 
III 
HUSSERL’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTHENTIC AND INAUTHENTIC THINKING 
 IN THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS  IN RELATION TO HEIDEGGER’S  
ANALYSIS OF DEATH IN BEING AND TIME —  
A PHILOSOPHICAL RE-CONSTRUCTION 
 
Towards the end of the Sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl elaborates a distinction 
between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’.63 By ‘authentic thinking’ Husserl 
means that form of thinking where the object of the act that is given by such 
 
62 Ibid., p. 309: ‘Tod ist je nur eigener’, Sein und Zeit, p. 265. Iain Thomson draws attention to 
difficulties in translating this sentence into English, in his article ‘Can I Die? Derrida on Heidegger 
on Death’, Philosophy Today, 43 No.1 (1999), 29–42. Thomson remarks, ‘taking eigen in the sense of 
the proper […] then perhaps the most “proper” translation would be: “death is always proprietary” 
[…] (O)r maybe: “death is always only (its) own,” even: “death is always only proper”.’ (p. 36). 
However, none of these translations quite catch the point that Heidegger wishes to make about one’s 
own death, hence Thomson concludes, ‘with the impropriety of suggesting […] “death is always 
most/just [one’s] own” (ibid.). That Heidegger takes this statement to be an analytically true 
statement, however, is evident from the context, which Thomson himself quotes: ‘Holding on to the 
truth of death — death is always most/just [one’s] own — shows another kind of certainty, more 
primordial than any certainty regarding beings encountered within the world or formal objects; for it 
is the certainty of being-in-the-world.’ Being and Time, p. 309:265, Thomson’s trans.: ‘Das Für-wahr-
halten des Todes — Tod ist je nur eigener — zeigt eine Andere Art und ist ursprünglicher als jede 
Gewißheit bezüglich eines innerweltlich begegnenden Seienden oder das formalen Gegestände; denn 
es ist des In-der-Welt-seins gewiß.’ Again, Heidegger clearly has Husserl’s reduction of the natural 
standpoint to the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint here in mind, and all the various 
kinds of epistemological certainties that Husserl’s reduction uncovers through his eidetic analyses of 
a thing (Ding) given to outer perceptual-sense experience and of a (conscious) experience (Erlebnis) 
given in reflective immanent perception, though this is not mentioned by Heidegger, but it is the 
point of comparison for Heidegger. 
63 Cf., Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, Sixth Logical Investigation, Chapter 8 The A Priori Laws 
of Authentic and Inauthentic Thinking (§ 59–§66), in particular, §62 ‘Our freedom in the categorial 
forming of given material and its limits. Purely categorical laws (laws of ‘authentic’ thinking)’, and 
§63 ‘The new laws of the validity of signitive and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic 
thinking)’. 
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thinking is the directly intended object as such, ‘in person’, as it were.64 ‘In person’ 
has to be understood in an analogous sense of ordinary perception. Take, for 
example, one of Husserl’s own examples, the judgment ‘colour implies extension’. 
Where is the experiential origin of this a priori judgement to be found? For Husserl 
it is not particular colours, as any empirical judgement about factual colours cannot 
justify the necessity of an a priori judgment (that if a colour exists it must be 
extended), but about colour itself as a general object. So, just as particular colours 
(blues, greens, reds, greeny blues, bluey greens, etc.) are no more mysteriously 
presented to outer perceptual-sense experience so, too, colour itself  (as a universal 
object and about true judgements can be made) is presented to eidetic ideation ‘in 
person’, ‘in its living, bodily presence’, ‘so to speak (sozusagen)’, as Husserl puts it in 
Ideas I.65 Thanks to the univocal understanding of the intentional object as the 
intended object of an intentional psychical act-experience, transition between 
different levels of meaning can be retrieved, but it is the perceptual grasp of the 
meaning of the intended universal object itself (i.e., colour as a universal object of 
the experience) that is the phenomenal basis of the a priori judgement. It is such 
‘universal objects’, or ‘essences’ as Husserl calls them after the Logical Investigations, 
that lie as the universal basis of all of the experiences of valid normative logical, 
ethical, aesthetical consciousness as such.66 
‘Inauthentic thinking’, by contrast, denotes a mode of thinking that does not 
present its intended object in a directly intuitive demonstrable fashion, such as, for 
instance, the description of a bridge in a novel. By comparison to perceptually-
founded acts, all linguistic statements about something that is not the object of my 
direct intuition are categorised by Husserl as inauthentic forms of thinking. 
Nevertheless, and this is of importance, such linguistic statements do present an 
object, they are intuitive, but they are symbolically (or signitively) intuitive.67 Thus 
 
64 This is Husserl’s expressed commitment to clarifying the meaning of concepts by return to 
‘intuition’. It is, perhaps, most clearly articulated Husserl in his famous principle of all principles in 
Ideas I, but ‘in person’ has to be understood in an analogous sense. See, following note. 
65 Sometimes this ‘principle of all principles’ is taken ‘literally’ by some interpreters as maintaining 
that Husserl is referring to a living embodied being, but this is to entirely misunderstand and 
misrepresent his principle. Colour, as a general object, is not regarded by Husserl as a living 
embodied being. Husserl theory of outer perception of other fellow human beings does leave a lot to 
be desired, but this has nothing to do with his principle of all principles defended in Ideas I. Husserl 
had already noted in the Logical Investigations that to deny the reality of ‘colour in general’ (it is not a 
colour) is not to deny it objectivity, for, colour, as a general object, is given in ‘ideational abstraction’ 
(Logical Investigations, vol. 1, p. 128). This universal object is the experiential basis or origins that a priori 
knowledge-claims about colour itself rest. 
66 This is not a defence of, or a return to any form of ‘realism’ (of a Scholastic-Aristotelian or other 
variety), as some commentators and critics at the time, and still today, wrongly, believe. It is, rather, 
an advancement of Brentano’s modern descriptive-psychological point of view that takes the direct 
object of perception to be the intended object of that perception. See, Brentano, Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint (1874), p. 88. If all intentional objects are intended objects, then Husserl is right 
to say that all such objects, analytically, refer to acts that intend them. Though Brentano did not spot 
the implications for correlative-constitutive analysis, this is a development by Husserl of Brentano’s 
descriptive-psychological ideas, as Husserl repeatedly pointed out.  
67 Husserl tells us that he learned this distinction between intuitively fulfilled and unfilled 
presentations from Brentano, while attending the latter’s lectures on descriptive psychology at 
Vienna (1884–1886). See, Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, trans. by Linda L. McAlister, 
in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55 (p. 49–
50). 
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when I see for myself what it is that is intended by the description (even if this 
perception occurs in an act of imagination, as it most often does, such as when one 
identifies the bridge that the author was describing while reading his book) the 
signifying description becomes in one’s awareness intuitively fulfilled. The signitively 
intended object is now the directly intended object of intuition, once we have peered 
through, as it were, the description to that of which it was a description.68 This 
transition is an experience of consciousness and marks a change in the experience of 
the mode of presentation by and to consciousness (from an emptily signified one to 
an intuitively fulfilled one). This is a phenomenological fact of consciousness that is 
observable in consciousness, or, perhaps more accurately stated, this is a tenet 
verifiable from within a purely descriptive-psychological methodological point of 
view. In this transitional experience and ‘fulfilment’ of meaning, nonetheless, 
Husserl remarks, the sign drops out (thanks to the univocal understanding of 
intentional object as the intended object of the act).69 This is what Heidegger is 
alluding to when he draws our attention, in a footnote reference in Being and Time, to 
the Logical Investigations and to Husserl’s point that the ‘[descriptive-psychological] 
thesis that all cognition has “intuition” as its goal, has the temporal meaning that all 
cognizing is making present’.70 Though Heidegger acknowledges the significance 
that ‘all cognition has such intuition as its goal’ as a critical descriptive-psychological 
tenet in Husserl’s philosophy (and its crucial linkage of the meaning of being in 
relation to time cannot be underestimated) Heidegger does continue to intimate that 
‘(W)hether every science, or even philosophical cognition, aims at a making-present, 
need not be decided here’.71  For Husserl and in his elaboration of his new science of 
phenomenology that requires absolute justification (in the intuition of essences), it 
is imperative that he aims precisely at making present just such a basis in his new eidetic 
science of consciousness and its objectivities.72 Heidegger, as we shall see, however, 
has good reason to doubt whether such a goal can always be reached in all forms of 
‘science’ and ‘cognition’, especially when Heidegger tries to explain what it is exactly 
that is being made-present when one reaches a genuine understanding of seeing the 
significance of the meaning of one’s own death. 
One of the major phenomenological exercises that Heidegger sets for 
himself in the writing of Being and Time is to trace the meaning of the concept of 
death back to its origins, that is, back to its intuitive presence as a directly intended 
object of a legitimating experience. The result of this ‘phenomenological exercise’ for 
Heidegger is this. 
 
68 This distinction in the Logical Investigations between ‘adequate and inadequate perception’, where 
inadequate perceptions [of linguistic descriptions] can, within limits, become adequate perception 
must not be confused with the concept of the perception of a physical thing that is, in principle, 
incomplete or inadequate, on account of a physical thing’s spatial composition admitting further 
legitimating outer perceptual-sense perceptions of that thing, that Husserl notes and discusses in his 
famous reduction in Ideas I. 
69 See, de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, pp. 12–17. 
70 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 498, n. xxiii.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Thus I cannot agree with Sebastian Luft’s contention that ‘Husserl equivocates’ on what Husserl 
takes to be ‘eidetic’ (p. 173, n. 25) in the ‘eidetic analysis’ that he advances; I entirely agree, however, 
with this commentator that Heidegger rejects the possibility of applying such analysis to the facticity 
of Dasein — but Heidegger can only do this, as Luft intimates, by advancing Dilthey’s hermeneutic 
method and not Husserl’s method of phenomenological enquiry. See, ibid., n. 19 (p. 172) and n. 39 (p. 175). 
 109  
Insofar as I am at all, as a matter of (biological) fact, my death is absent. 
Insofar, however, as I am aware of the fact I am a being-for-death, I am also aware 
of my entire existence as finite. In this respect, I am aware of my death as 
something that ‘is just one’s own’.73 Although my death is something that is never 
present, the awareness I have of my own death, is nonetheless, something that is 
always and invariably an integral part of my own existence. My death, in other 
words, is something that cannot be something that is merely signitively referred to in 
the awareness that I (might) have of my death. My death, rather, is something with 
which I have some degree of direct familiarity as an intrinsic feature and reality of 
my actual existence in Dasein, even if I seldom reflect upon such a fact of (my) life.74 
In sum, my death, although always absent, is, nevertheless, also always somehow 
implicitly present in my understanding of Being, from both an ontological and an 
existential-phenomenological perspective.  
 In setting up and analysing the meaning of my own death as a task for 
phenomenology and phenomenological research, Heidegger discovers a task whose 
authentic thinking about its intended object, the anticipatory awareness of one’s 
own death, can never, in principle, be intuitively fulfilled by what one says about the 
death of the other. Thus in his construction of his analysis of death around what one 
says about death and what I can see about my own death, and in his attempt to pursue 
an authentic line of thinking about one’s own death, Heidegger encounters a 
phenomenon that challenges the parameters that Husserl had configured around 
‘empty-signifying’ and ‘intuitively-fulfilling intuitions’ in the Sixth Logical 
Investigation. This, in turn, undermines the hegemony of the very distinction 
between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’ that characterises the thinking 
developed by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. The upshot of Heidegger’s analysis 
of death in Being and Time, then, is that whereas one can see, authentically, that one’s 
own death is something that can never be (re)presented, one can talk about death as 
it is directly intuitively presented (in the death of another) but only inauthentically 
so.  
My death, therefore, when understood as the directly intended object of the 
intentional activity characteristic of the anticipatory awareness of one’s own death, 
is an un-objectifiable presence both in its own right and on its own terms. It thus resides 
outside of any conceivable or possible object of intentional-representational 
consciousness that I could have, or do actually experience (and must experience in 
 
73 See, supra, n. 62. 
74 ‘Yet the factical rarity of anxiety as a phenomenon cannot deprive it of its fitness to take over a 
methodological function in principle for the existential analytic. On the contrary, the rarity of the 
phenomenon is an index that Dasein, which for the most part remains concealed from itself in its 
authenticity because of the way things have been publicly interpreted by the “they”, becomes 
disclosable in a primordial sense in this basic state-of-mind.’ Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. mod., 
p. 235:190. Heidegger, in fact, argues even further that we must cultivate this possibility of brooding 
over one’s own self in anticipation over one’s own death as an existential requirement, rather than 
engage in ‘idle chatter’ (Gerede) about the death of others (e.g., in reading obituaries). See, Being and 
Time, p. 306:261. According to Heidegger, nonetheless, one cannot reflect, at will, on the significance 
of one’s own death; one, rather, has (to wait) to be assailed by the mood of Angst. While in the mood 
of Angst, nevertheless, Heidegger asserts that one must engage, willingly, in ‘inner brooding over 
one’s death’, if one is to methodologically analysis the meaning of the phenomenon of one’s own 
death. 
110 
 
immanent time consciousness as Husserl argues).75 Levinas, therefore, is correct to 
point out that it is precisely in relation to Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of 
the meaning of one’s own death that Heidegger demonstrates the inapplicability of 
examining the meaning of death — whether it is the meaning of my own death, or 
the death of another, as Levinas acutely points out, does not matter — in terms of 
intentional re-presentifications (Ver-gegenwärtigen). In the very analysis of one’s own 
death that exhibits the fullness of the time of Dasein to itself, Heidegger, therefore, 
‘introduced an element of alterity into his [Heidegger’s] own phenomenological 
description of time in Being and Time’.76 This is where a significant, immanent 
criticism of Heidegger’s thinking can begin, and has been effected by Levinas, but 
before Levinas implemented his radical critique of Heidegger, Heidegger had 
already advanced Husserl’s idea of ‘transcendental phenomenology’ in a direction 
hitherto unheard of in Husserlian phenomenology and in western metaphysics 
towards the question of the meaning of Being and the significance of the experience 
of death in our understanding of that question. To be fair to Heidegger, then, 
assessing Heidegger’s originality and contribution to philosophy and 
phenomenological research would need to focus on the phenomenological merits 
and demerits of Heidegger’s hermeneutic retrieval of the significance of the 
experience of finitude characteristic of human consciousness as a ‘being-for-death’ 
in the mood of Angst in relation to ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ as 
documented in Being and Time, Heidegger’s first, albeit incomplete, major publication 
in philosophy and phenomenological research.77 This, however, is a task for another 
day.78 
 
 
75 Husserl argued that reflection on consciousness is only possible because of the temporal structure 
of consciousness is capable of extending into the future and past to permit reflection. I think 
commentators are correct to note that Heidegger does not follow this particular way of 
understanding time, but this leaves us with the question of what way does Heidegger understand 
time. See, Lilian Alweiss, ‘Heidegger and the Concept of Time’, History of the Human Sciences, 15 
(2002), 117–132. 
76 ‘Emmanuel Levinas’, in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 47–70 (p. 62). Why Heidegger does not prioritise 
this alterity in his analysis in Being and Time is due to his existentialistic rendering of Dilthey’s triad of 
experience-understanding-expression where Dasein is concerned about expressing concern about its 
own being, first and foremost, in whatever it does. The significance of the death of the other, which 
is of no methodological significance ‘either ontically or ontologically’ to Heidegger (Being and Time, p. 
283:239) in his elaboration of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ is, however, pursued by Levinas 
in his thought, and by others. See, Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by T. Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993); ‘Apories: Mourir–s’attendre aux limités de la vérité,’ in Le Passage des frontières: 
Autour du travail de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1993).  
77 I have made some remarks towards such a critique of Heidegger’s analysis of finitude in, ‘The 
Task and Significance of Philosophical Reflection on the Relation of the Finite to the Infinite after 
Kant, in Husserl, Heidegger and Schleiermacher’, Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society (2010), ed. by 
Julia Hynes (Irish Philosophical Society: Dublin, 2011), pp. 93–116, esp. Section III ‘Schleiermacher 
on the Task and Significance of Thinking the Finite and Infinite together, after Kant’, pp. 112–116 
(p. 113). 
78 This article is a revised version of a paper that I gave at the Irish Philosophical Spring Conference 
on ‘The Futures of Phenomenology’, held in the National University of Ireland Galway (on 6th 
March 2010). I would like to thank those present for their discussion on this paper. I would also like 
to thank very much Haydn Gurmin, Susan Gottlöber and the reviewer for very helpful comments 
towards improving this article. 
